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THE DEVIL AND JIMMY BYRNES 
by Frederick L. Schuman 
0 N October 15, 1947, Harper and Brothers published James F. Byrnes' Speaking Frankly, a book which has aroused 
widespread comment at home and abroad. The scope of the 
comment is amply justified. This is the most important and 
revealing book on U.S. foreign policy to appear since the war. 
It is a record of experience and a confession of faith by the 
chief 'architect of that policy. It is also the most baffling, incred- 
ible and terrifying document to come from the pen of a respon- 
sible American official in many years. 
Man - and Nemesis I 
Let no one suppose that this is merely- another outbreak of 
- symptoms in the current epidemic of anti-Soviet hysteria and 
D.T.'s. Mr. Byrnes is a man of reason who all his life has sought 
peace through compromise. He is mild, modest, almost mouse; 
like-albeit not without Irish pride and temper, as shown by 
his demand for Henry Wallace's dismissal from the Cabinet after 
his public criticism of Mr. Byrnes' policies. This shrewd South 
Carolinian was, successively, altaf-boy (before he turned Epis- 
copalian), local politician, Congressman, lawyer, Senator, Su- 
preme Court Justice, Director. of Economic Stabilization, Director 
of War Mobilization, and Secretary of State (July, 1945-January, 
1947). Few men have served their country more ably or been 
more honored by it. Here is no Bullitt, Earle, Luce or Burnham. 
Mr. Byrnes, I am wholly convhced, is a citizen of good will, a 
genuine Christian in the best sense, a splendid American, a 
Roosevelt "New Dealer" (though he may not-now like the term), 
and a mover and thinker who is devoutly concerned, to a degree 
rare among public servants, with the welfare of his countrymen 
and of all the world's people. 
t 
It is precisely ihese attributes which give to his work and 
words an appalling quality of nightmarish &sanity which, if 
. uncured, can leave no hope whatever for the survival OF civilized 
mankind. The reader who knows no more of the diplomatic 
record than what is told in the book or is vaguely remembered 
from headlines will scarcely detect the element of madness here. 
- Yet here it i~-~ojsonous, patliologicil and, pathetic-to such a 
(I~gree as to justify comple~ely the gloomiest pmgnoses of a 
Spengler or a .Toynbee regaiding demovatic statesmanship in 
decadent civilizations. By some subtle magic, Jimmy Bymess- 
who, unlike Faust, has no comprehension of what he-has done 
-has .sold h& mind and soul t o  the dark god variously known 
as Beelzebub, ,Satan or Mephistopheles. . 
6 <. 
Split Penonali+y. , 
In, its general tone, however, the book sounds deceptively sane. 
Byrnes' contacts with Soviet leaders began at the flalta Confer- 
ene of February, 1945 to which Roosevelt insisted he come. ~ h e p  . . 
continued through the Potsdam Conference, the deadlocked, 
September meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the sue- 
' ce~sfulAsession of the Three Foreign Ministers in Moscow in . 
' December, the U.N. Assembly in London in January, ig46,- the 
Paris meetings of Foreign Ministers in spring and summer, the ,- 
Paris Peace Conference of. ~ u l ~ - ~ c t o b e r ,  I 946, and the New York ,' 
Countil session of December where fivi peace treaties were'finally 
approved. He warmly endorses Stain's view that "it is our duty - 
to see that our relations in peace-time are as strong as they have - . 
been in war." (p. 44) Stalin he describes as "a very likeabletpe*- . 
- son" @. -45)- and Molotov as able, shrewd, gracious, persistent 
and, ekasperating. 
4 
Byrnes recounts instance after instance of Soviet concegsions 
and corn~roomises. He is flatly opp6sqd to ~ i e r i c a n  intervention 
. in China. "The besi course is -to krithdraw," to retain our ':reser- . - 
- voir of goodwill" and remain '6n the side of progress in Asia." 
-(p. 229) While he neyer admits that he himself ever wrong, 
he grants that "many issues admit of honest differences of opin- 
i&n.'We .  . cannot-and must not claim ingallibiliiy for our policy 
.decisions." (p. 3 12) 
- I 
The, problem of. explaining Mr. Byrnes arises from numerous 
other passages where endorsement is given to almost all the 
cliches about , the Soviet Union whieh- are the stc&in-trade .of 
e 
, the Russophobes and Red-baiters of government; business, press 
and radio peith purposes of their own to serve. Mr. Byrnes' pur: 
poses, one would like. t o  believe, are -of a different order. But 
his sales technique is suspiciously similar. In mealy-m~~thed 
. self-righ teousness, he paint+ a portrait of American diplqmacy 
. dedicated consistently to-peace, democracy, freedom and rectitude , 
and constantly obstructed in its quest for virtue by Soviet wicked- 
ness: Russian "expansionism" is alarming and elearly sinful, in 
contrast to American expariiionism which is at once noble and 
non-existent. .Russian e~pansionism, it -Ferns, is old. Karl Marx 
. 
is quoted against it. Bolshevik expansionism is' mbre dangerous 
than Tsarist expansionism - because it ,has an . "aggressive ideol- 
ogy." "Greece is apparently their first objective." Italy may be 
next. "I do not'doubt that their ultimate goal is to dominate, in 
one way or another, all of Europe." (p. 295) Therefore "firm- 
ness" is needed the Truman ~oct 'rine is :'correct,"' although 
-somewhat "n~rvous" (p. 302), the so-calbd Marshall Plan is 
excellent, Hungary must be rescued, etc. Here again, between 
the lines of Mrt,.Byrnes' unemotional prose, the Red Monster is 
reaching out menacingly' to gobble up all. of God's children, 
-and all-good men and true must rally to halt its fiendish onrush . 
and save Christianity, Capitalism .and Civilizati.on from annihi- 
lation. 
The present writer has repeatedly written and said that these 
views are not only utterly nonsensical but that their propaga- 
- iion is dangerous to the point of criminality. I propose to con- 
tinue speaking and writing to the same effect so lolig as freedom 
of speech survives. The question as to why Americans believe 
these falsehoods is easily answered: they have been assured of 
their truth: b; most of their ne;spapers - and periodicah; by 
' 
- almost all ~~mmentators still broadcasting, by many of their ' 
clergymen, and by virtually all ,of- their public leaders, including 
Mr. Byrnes; The question as to why (or whether) Mr. Byrnes 
believes them to be true is more compl& But it merits explora- . 
tion. Fortuhtely, such exploration is possible because Mr. 
Byrnes has a conscience and a feeling for accuracy and honesty 
- ~e doei not confine himself, as do most'others of this school, to 
- mere e r n a t i o n  and defamation. His "'evidence" is nowhere 
stated ip one place, but is scattered through the b k .  - 
It deserves evaluation. 
Double Sfandard 
'Mr. Byrnes is rightly troubled by "violations of pledges." The 
'. Yalta accords, - for example, were "useful" because they are "the 
basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions 
in Eastern Europe have been in violation of. ~ussia's pledged 
word." -(p. 34) The Potsdam agreements "did make the confer: 
ence a success but the violation of these agreements has turned 
success into failure." (p. 87) As for the Moscow accords of 
December, 1945, had they been "as favorable to the Soviet Union 
as some critics have charged, the Soviets would not have violated 
them. And the fact that ever since we have been protesting 
against these violatiins indicates that they were in the best in- 
terests of the liberated States." (p. 239) Leaving aside this curi- 
ous non-sequitur (one of many in the book), what is the basis of 
the contention, now accepted as a truism by the government and 
many of the people of the USA, that the USSR has violated its 
pledges? 4 
Its essence is simply that when Washington's interpretation 
of an agreement differs from Moscow's interpretation, the former ' 
is obviously right and the latter obviously wrong. If America ' 
and Britain define "democracy," "free elections" or "Fascists" 
in one way and the Soviet U,nion defines them in another, the 
same rule holds. In sober fact when an agreement calls for "joint 
assistance" and refers to "joint responsibilities" to be discharged 
"when in the opinion of the three governments, conditions make 
such action necessary," all logic and law prescribe that the action 
in question is to be taken when the three governfnents are 
agreed and that none can properly be taken when they are not 
agreed. Not so, however, with Mr. Byrnes and the State ~ e ~ a r t -  
ment. Under the Truman dispensation such pledges mean that 
when there is no agreement Moscow must do what Washington 
and London demand-and if it refuses, it is guilty. of a breach of 
Eaith. 
Is it conceivable that the USA or Britain has ever violated 
pledges? Hardly. ~rmkness obliges Mr. Byrnes to note that the 
U.S. agreed to the admission of Argentina to the U.N. at San 
Francisco in violation (said.Stalin) of Roosevelt's statement at 
Yalta. He quotes Stalin on the Polish question as saying: "Even 
'though the Russians are simple people, the West often makes 
the mistake of regardihg them as fools." (p. 62) At San Francisco, 
moreover, Stet tinius asserted that the ' USSR was "eligible" to 
t 
6 I 
receive a territory as a U.N: Trusteeship. But when Molotov 
later suggested that the USSR might receive a territory as a 
U.N. Trusteeship, this, Mr. Byrnes implies, was dear evidence 
of perfidy and sinful ambition. On September 15, 1944, Roose- 
velt and churchill at Quebec "approved the Morgenthau plan" 
. for .Germany (p. 184); but the subsequent repudiation not only 
of its details but of its purposes in Washington and London, 
somehow not a repudiation of the pledged word. Mr.' Byrnes 
solemnly agreed in Mosc~w, December 28, 1945, to "non-inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of China" and to "withdrawal-of 
~dviet  and American forces from China at the earliest practical 
moment." There has been no Soviet intervention in China. Soviet 
troops have long since been withdrawn. The U.S. has intervened 
to the tuneL-of billions of dollars. American troops are still. there. 
. By a logic never explained, this also adds up, mirabile dictu, not 
to an American but to a Soviet breach of faith! 
Mendacity by Deletion 
This perqistent dse of tivo scales in which to weigh American 
and Soviet policies is matched by a numtjer of amazing omissions 
in Mr. Byrnes' record-none of them, I believe, a prod~ci  of 
deliberate deception, but all of them a result of that familiar 
process whereby the mind, when worried by fears of guilt, sup- 
' presses into the unconscious all memory of the sources of 
anxiety' There is, for example, .no mention of Henry Wallace's 
w. 
, . arguments against Byrnes' policies and no effort to answer them. . 
The present tragic impasse in American-Soviet relations had its 
chief original source in Byrnes' statement of August -18, 1945, 
setonded by Bevin's speech of August so, wherein Washington 
and London, in the name of "democracy," opened the diplo- 
matic and propaganda campaign, which has continued ever 
since, to oust Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans. A highlight of this campaign, and a direct precursor 
' of the Tr-an ~octrine, was Churchill's."iron curtain" speech 
in Fulton, Mo., March 5, 1946. Not even a one-page outline of 
post-war diplomacy would be worth the paper 't is written on 
without mention of these statements of purpose. But, incredibly 
in a book of goo pages, Mr. Byrnes does not mention any of them 
#even once, much less discuss their import o r  impact. Neither 
does he indicate how and why the French and Chinese Foreign 
Ministers in Loncton ' ( ~ e ~ ~ e r n b k ,  1 945) consistently voted against 
' 7 
# 
, t i  
.~olotov-and-with ~ e v i @  and Bymes. He presentg (p. ' ~ 0 7 )  Arner- 
f ,3 i c h  pngnit~on of ,the ~rovisional Governments of Austria 
- , -+ 
(Odtober x?d, 1945) and Hungary (November 2) as gestures of 
;, ;! 
friehdship toward MOSCOW, with no. mention of the fact that . /  -7 
Vienna,_early in ~c t ibe r ,  had. yielded to ~n~lo-~meric i tn  pres- -"; , .  
sure i~ rejecting a Soviet proposal for. a *joint oil company and 2 
fl 
. that the antiSoviet Small Landowners' Party won the Budapkst , 
' muhicipal elections of October 7. '7 
. I  
. . 
. Perhaps the most glaring omission of all 'in these pages is ;?, 
the ghastly coqt of the war to the Soviet Union. Nowhere is this 
9:; 
cm&al determinant of Soviet policy more than hinted at. Mr. , 
A 3 
~~rm%,speaks '  for a nation which grew wealthy o n  the war to - - , 
one which w& fim-hilly deva~ated and impoverished. and I: 
thirty lives fm. every Americab life sacrificed to defeat the foe. , ?  I 
Yet Mr. Bymei can say that Soviet proposals f i r  reparitions 
. from currmt German production are "inexcusable" and that 
<. . ?,
"we (sic) should realize that, modern war being what it is, it is .* 
short-sighted and futile for aiy country to seek approximate ; , .:- -
compensation for losses it has sustain~d." .(p.,86) He is also silent - : 
on the refusal of'his go*ernment- to grant any post-war loans or :,* 
' &edits to the' USSR while pouring out billions for Britain, - L - 
~raice ,  Italy,  any and. Japan. With qonrmendable candor . -. . ": 
but unbelievable pettiness, - he does note, however (p$ 1 43-4)2 - - i( 
, that when he saw Czichoslovak ,delegates at Paris appla~d.  2 
Vyshinsky's criticism of American "dollar diplomacy," he f'irn- , - 
mm@ati;ly c&Ied~i~tructions to the State Department to stop -. I 
 he-^ extension of credits to ~zechoslo~kia." He also told Jan 
~ a s k y k  how "shocked" he ivas by' the' fact that Prague had, 
proposed to transfer a portion of the credit to Romania at a . 'i .+.- 
#prdfit. Yet on the next page be admits, as a "slight mitigation" 
. - - 7 ziJ 
of:~z&hoslovak sin, that a .U.S. Treasury ~ e ~ a r t m e n t  bfficial in ' :, 
Pkgne-'had been ask& about the Romanian transaction .and 
- had made no obiection. The credi! was never renewed. . . . 
. . 
Misrepresentation is i s  effective as omission in gilding the lily 
of de~ukion. On.page 38 Byrnes attribites to R ~ e l t  at Yalta 
a kqtemmt: *at Sumner Wellesmade a "q&taLe" in telling the 
Laiin -American Republics merely- to break reratioas 'with ~ e r -  .
fna'ny - rather than declare war. 'fSJever," - k o t e  Mr. WeUes in - ' 
reply, October 21, "during the years I sewed linder the pr&i- - , 
A 
8 
dint did the Department of State ever 'tell' any other American 
Republic what action it should take. Never did President Roose- 
velt suggest such a step. It was only after Mr. Byrnes was ap- 
pointed Secretary of State that 'telling' our American neighbors 
became a feature of our policy." Mr. Bvnes also tells of his 
"shock" (p. 255) at Stalin's speech of February g, 1946, "in 
which he announced the new Five-Year Plan with its emphasis 
1 on rearmament instead of the production of consumer gbods." 
Anyone who cares to reread the speech will recognize that any 
such description of it is a falsehood, Again: "As I said in 
Charleston on November 16, 1945, the suggestion that we 
might use the atomic bomb 'as a diplomatic or military threat 
against any nation is not only untrue in fact but is a wholly 
unwarranted reflection upon the American government and 
people.' " -@. 275) Comment is needless. 
Yet again:/the USSR concluded its neutrality and non-aggres- 
sion pact of 1939 with Hitler (who flagrantly viol?ted jt 22- 
months later) with no conviction that it would escape ultimate 
attack by the Nazi Reich. "Thus, it seems clear that the Soviet 
- Gavernme~t concluded the pact .while fully intending- to violate 
it." (p. 286) Evidence: none, sin&! there is none. Arguments: if 
I conclude a contract with my neighbor who, I fear, may break 
it, this proves that I intend to break it! Finally, Mr. Byrneq 
makes much (pp. 288 f.) of the contention, allegedly derived 
from the Nuremberg documents, that Hitler decided to attack 
the- USSR after Molotov had proposed in Berlin, November 
12-13, ig40, a new regime for the Straits and a Soviet-Bulgarian 
mutual aid' pact. '!This was the decisive moment." In fact the 
Nuremberg documents show beyond- question that the N h i  
decision to invade the USSR was reached in August, 1940. Jodl - 
and his staff officers were well advanced in planning the invasion 
when Molotov came to Berlin. These documents are public 
'knowledge. Mr. Byrnes is a former Secretary of State. There- 
fore . . .? 
Program 
On the broader theme Mr. Byrnes is concerned with arguing 
three general propositions: (1) the deteriorition of American- . 
Soviet relations began before Roosevelt died and is therefore 
not attributable to President Truman or Mr. Byrnes; (2) there ' 
was not (or maybe there was-M& Byrnes is here confused) an* 
accord between the Western Powers a d  the Soviet Union on 
"spheres of influence" in Eastern Europe; (3) Germany must be 
restored as a bulwark against the Red Menace. 
The first of these propositions i s  demonstrably false, on Mr. 
Byrnesy own evidence. The second lies at the very heart of the 
problem of American-Soviet relations since V-J day. The third 
is the Truman-Byrnes-M-arshall prescription for World War 111. 
The Firmness of F o D o R o  
Aften Yalta President Roosevelt was disturbed, says Byrnes, 
by Soviet policy in Romania and Poland and by Stalin's belief - that Anglo-American parleys for the surrender of Kesselring's 
army in Italy involved te rm permitting the transfer of German 
divisions to the Eastern Front 'and suggesting -a "soft peace" for 
the Reich. Roosevelt expressed resentment at the "vile misrepre 
sentations" of Stalin's informers. Stalin made a conciliatbry 
. reply. The incident was closed on April 11, 1945. F,D.R. in- 
variably resolved such frictions satisfactorily because, unlike his 
successor, he wanted a settlement for peace and not occasions 
for conflict. On April 12, notes Mr. Byrnes, the President, an 
hour before he died, sent a message to Churchill, urging that the 
"Soviet problem" be minimized as much as possible "because 
these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day 
and most of them straighten out. . . . We must be firm, however, 
and our course thus far is correct." (p. 59) 
. Mr. Byrnes disproves his own point because he does not under- 
stand the course. Franklin D. Roosevelt's course was to treat the 
Soviet Union as an equal, to minimize frictions, and to adjust 
differences by discussion and compromise-all of which was 
diametrically opposite to the course of President Truman, who 
conferred with Leahy, Marshall, Patterson and Forrestal before 
meeting,Molotov on his way to San Francisco. "It was not," says 
Byrnes cryptically (p. 61), "a very harmonious .meeting and 
. ended rather abruptly." To the work, thus meanly begun, of 
wrecking the wartime coalition, Byrnes added his labors in 
August of the year of victory, and intermittently thereafter. 
Broken Bargain 
- On 'the moot question of whether or not Washington, London 
and Moscow reached agreement, before or after Yalta, on 
"spheres of influence," Mr. Byrnes, all unwittingly, has performed 
a real service (for those with eyes to see) in settling the issue. 
There was in fact an agreement that Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans north of Greece should be regarded as a Soviet security 
zone, while Western Europe, Italy and the Mediterranean, in- 
cluding Greece, were recognized by Moscow as part of the Anglo- 
American security zone, It is precisely the violation and repu- 
diation of this understanding by Byrnes and Bevin which has 
driven the Big Three off the road of unity and toward the valley 
of disaster. In his rambling and confused kedtal of controversies 
over Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, Mr. Byrnes obscures real- 
ities. Yet, by happy accident, he has since let the cat out ,of the 
bag. On page 53 he wrote that Churchill and Eden in Moscow 
in October, 1944, reached an "informal understanding that, if 
the British found it necessai) to take military action in Greece, 
the Soviets would not interfere. In return, the British would 
recognize the right of the Soviets to take the lead in mainraining 
order in Romania." When an anonymous "British ,Foreign 
Office spokesman" on October 16, 1947, declared that this state- ' 
ment was "inco~rect," Mr. Byrnes was moved by a desire for 
, self-justification to make a further revelation which demolishes 
the whole basis of his policy: 
Evidently (he asserted, New York Times, October 18, 
-1947) the Foreign Office spokesman is not informed, My 
statement was based on a message from Prime Minister 
Churchill to President Roosevelt, dated March 8, 1945, in 
the first paragraph of which; after deploring Soviet actions 
in Romania, Mr. Churchill said: "We have been hampered 
in our protests against these developments by \the fact that, 
in order to have the freedom to save Greece, Eden and I at 
. Moscow in October recognized that Russia should have a 
largely preponderant voice in Romania and Bulgaria while 
we took the lead in Greece. Stalin adhered very strictly to 
this understanding during the thirty days' fighting against 
the Communists and Elas' in the city of Athens, in spite 
of the fact that all this was most - disagreeable to him and 
those around him." 
The question is thus answered. At no time did Moscow pro- 
test against or challenge' the British action in Greece in i944-45, 
shameful as that action was, as long as the Kremlin believed that 
* London an8 Washington were reconciled to preponderant Soviet 
influence in the Balkans north of Greece. Yalta and Potsdam 
seemed to Moscow, and quite plausibly, to confirm this under- 
11 
ktanding. Byrnes and Bevin repudiated - it. in August, 1945. - 
-Washington and London have been seeking ever since (and 
thus far quite- in vain) to challenge and destroy Soviet influence 
in the area they originally acknowledged to be part of the Soviet 
security zone. Moscow has retaliated-and will continue to do so, 
- since it regards the unity of Slavic Europe under ~&covite 
leadership as an indispensable condition \of Soviet safety which 
in no way threatens British- or American interests-as Roosevelt 
and, originally, Churchill conceded without questibn. The sub-' 
sequent Byines-Bevin-Truman-Marshall program for ousting the 
USSR from ~ a s t e h  Europe and the Balkans and reconstituting 
these communitiks as an anti-Soviet bulwark is a direct and ' ~ n  
attack u -gn  all ,the objectives for which the Soviet Union fought 
and won &s war against the &is. 
;$$p2 Deutschland O ber Alles 
ss*-kF --:%A Since it is now clear that this challenge 'has failed, that the 
Truman Doctrine is bankrupt, and that no effective counter- 
weights- to Soviet power can be established in-Poland, Czecho- 
slovakia or the Balkans, the little men in Washington have 
turned eagerly to an obvious alternative: the restoration of 
Germany (and prospectively Japan and China) as an anti-soviet 
~i,, bastion. This is the meaning of the ~ a r s h d l  Plan. In support- 
%: ing it, Mr.. Byrnes arrives at his formula for World War 111. He 
?'k 
$2: notes '(pp. 26, 29, 86) that the USSR is committed to a German 
.;%t I :g settlement whereby if will share >n international control of the 
: I:\ Ruhr and will be granted, as Roosevelt~ agreed at Yalta (at least 
\):;as. a basis for discussion), the equivalent of lo billion dollars in - .-. 
.?-. reparations from Germany, out of a proposed total of 20 billions. 
,\ ~T 
$& This, says Mr. Byrnes, is intolerable. ,The USSR should abandon 
,%both demands, agree to the reunification of the Reich, and ac- 
< .  .<: cept instead a 25-year or a 40-year veaty with the USA, 
&continued German disarmament and mdtual aid against future 
'--.German aggression. .If Moscow doubts the efficacy of this ar- ?A& 
~s~Grangement and insists on its original proposals, it is guilty of 
'5 - delay, obstructionism, expansionism and wicked designs to pro- - 
!:<: &ote -&aos. / 
"My patience was euhausted," writes the Secretary of State - 
(p. 175) when Molotov insisted on lo billions in reparations. ' 
AtLStuttgart (Sepiember 6, 1946) Byrnes appealed to .German 
nationalism by arguing for German unity and challenging the 
new Polish-German frontier. Bevin and Churchill sent congratu. 
latiom. Byrnes (pp. 192-3) held a secret parley in Paris with 
Churchill and Smuts to celebrate the new line on Germany. 
"The Stuttgart speech,'' notes Mr. Byrnes correctly (p. ig4), 
"continues to represent American policy toward Germany.'' 
Since Moscow will hot agree and insists, sinfully, on Four- 
power control of the Ruhr and lo billions in reparation, what 
is to be done? Mr. Byrnes has a clear answer. "Wisddm and 
justice will prevent the United States from ever acceding to the 
soviet demands either on the Ruhr or on reparations." Inter- 
nationalization and socialization in the Reich -are both unthink- 
able. America must therefore act- (read this citrefully; it is not 
a misprint!)-to see that "the control of Gqman industries should 
be turned back to the owners" (p. 195, my italics)-i.e., the 
private monopolists and carteleers who put Hitler in power and . - 
. - 
furnished the arsenal of the German war machine in World 
Wars I and I1 and, prospectitely, 111, despite Mr. Byrnes' en- 
thusiasm for "disarmament." Asaerica should demand a peace . 
conferepce on Germany early in 1948. If the USSR refus& to 
.participate or to accept the knglo-~mkrican terms, a separate 
' German peace must be made with a German Government in 
the combined Western zones, providing for the evacuation of all 
German territory by foreign troops. If Moscow refuses to agree, 
* 
,then America must ask the U.N. Security Council to eject Soviet 
troops frem Eastern Germany, since their continued presence 
"would constitute a threat to the peace of the world." 
War For Peace 
America has "obligations" and "pledges" (apparently to 
Germany) that must be fulfilled.'"We must be- clear . . . that 
we are willing to adopt these measures of last resort if, for 
the peace of the world, we are forced to do so. . . . J hope, believe, 
.and I pray that the leaders of the Soviet Union will never force , 
us to this course of last resort. -But they must learn what Hitler 
learned-that the world is not going to permit one nation -to ' 
veto peace on earth (p. 203). . . . We must use our best efforts 
to develop better (atomic) bombs and more of them (p. ~ j j .  -  . 
Today there is no military strength in Europe to restrain the 
, Russians. Only the power of the United Nations can do. it. The ' 
United  ati ions must make known its determination to act to 
. protect the threasened State. And the United States must , make . 
known its determination to use all of its power to support the 
action of the United Nations." (p. 297) 
For all Americans still in their right minds, no comment is 
called for on these propositions. They are, as the London Tinies 
put it on October 16,-"little better than a simple recipe forwar." 
Mr. Byrnes, observed the London News Chronicle, "has talked 
deplorable and dangerous nonsense." Wrote the London Daily 
Mirror: "Mr. Byrnes . . . is so frank as openly to advocate war 
with Russia. Is this wickedness, idiocy or a mixture of both?" 
Mr. Byrnes on October 22 expressed pained surprise at the 
notion that he had proposed using force to drive the Russians 
out of Germany, for he did not use the word- "force" (only 
"measures of last resort"!) and his refeience to atomic bqmbs 
"appeared in another chapter of the book." ~ r n i t r i  Manuilsky. 
on October 18 said ~ ~ r h k s  is !'asking, for war against the Soviet 
Union." Pravda on the next day called his book "a direct appeal 
- for war with the Soviet Union." Vyshinsky on October 22 con- 
curred in the view that Byrnei' proposals were "a recipe for war" 
,against the USSR. 
Final Judgment 
8 
These British and Soviet evaluations of. Byrnes' book, and of 
the current American policy which Mr. Byrnes first formulated, 
are entirely correct. Never under any threat will the Soviet 
leaders and people abandon Eastern Germany and Slavic Europe 
to AngIo-Arderican control and to inevitable future use as new 
- bases of attack against the Soviet Union. The children of Mother 
Russia have thrice in a single generation heroically faced death 
against the assaults of the Kaiser's Reich, the Allied and Ameri- 
can interventionists, and the Fascist Powers. T o  the last man, 
woman, and child, they will all  face death again before they 
yield . to such demands as Byrries proposes. Since Mr. Byrnes, 
who is-mot stupid, must be presumed to. know this; no other - conclusion can be drawn but-that he sincerely believes that the 
.values he lives by and the interests he serves can best be pro- , 
moted by an anti-Soviet war. Such a war, he must suppose, would 
be brief, cheap and merciful, with atomic bombs dispelling the - 
Red Menace for all time. Suih a war, of course, must be "de- 
fensive." Hence the formula of U.S. support of U.N. actioa to. 
- rescue Prussia from the Russians. Perhaps Mr. Byrnes should be 
reminded that every act of aggression by the late Nazi leaders 
mias'* "&fen+" in exactly this sense. At Nuremberg, wrote 
H e q  L. Stimson (Foreign Affairs, January, 1947). kas ''affirmed 
t& eimple principle of peace-that the man who makes or 
, - , pjlans aggressive war is a criminal. . . ." 
Is Jimmy Byrnes-able, affable, well-meaning and earnest-no 
better than the mass murderers who died on the gallows? No 
American today could accept any such monstrous view. But acts 
.of men are judged less by their motives than- by their fruits. 
If Mr. Bymes' advice is taken, the most hideous of Nazi atrocities 
will pale 'before the infernal spectacle. of scores of millions of 
human Feings perishing in agony by fireand poison. No courts 
will .remain. however, to try the culprits,, since courts are products 
of civilization. All civilization as we know it will crumble into 
..radio-active dust and rubble if Mr. Byrnes has his way. The war 
he dreams of cantlot be won by either side. Russians don't sur- 
render. Russians also have atomic physicists and big industry. 
This war means the end of our culture. It was Mr. Byrnes himself 
who once said: "There must be one world for all of us, or there 
will be no world for any of us." 
Mr. Byrnes is not a vicious man. Neither were Keitel, Frick, 
Papen, Jodl or Neurath. Mr. Byrnes wants peace. Mr. Byrnes 
wants Soviet surrender without war.  he special skill of Mr. 
Bymes' private devil (who knows full well what the road to 
damnatiqn is paved with, and who also administers to the needs 
- of many other public figures) is that he leaves his victim a per- 
fectly moral and patriotic Christian, who is merely mistaken in 
his political and military judgments.   he offense is so small as 
to seem inconsequemial. But its consequences in the atomic age 
.may well be the murder of most of ,the human race. . . . 
Is America still capable of a return to sanity? The answer, 
perhaps mercifully, is still unclear. Only this is clear: if the 
American people lack the wit and will to rec'apture the vision of 
~ranklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, and to give new 
life to such hopes as are voiced by ~ e g q  A. Wallace, Glen 
Taylor, Claude Pepper apd Wayne Marse, they will have made- 
a covenant with hell and a pact with death. The measure of 
their ignorance, incapacity and deviltry is the fact that saintly 
Jimmy Byrnes is now the best advocate of Satan. The measure 
of their wisdom, resolve and righteousness remains to be taken. 
Who:then shall be his brother's keeper3 
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